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1 Observing Systems
Our lifeworld is replete with systems which are 
familiar to us, which we (have to) trust, and with 
connections in and among systems which we 
often merely have an inkling of, but by no me-
ans comprehend. We commonly use a system, 
an automobile, so that we can transport oursel-
ves “individually”. The vast majority of us has 
only a vague idea how it works. We pursue the 
superficial information displays and operate the 
instruments. Then we move simultaneously with 
many others in the orientation on a system of 
rules with all sorts of normative expectations. 
The road users, together with their technical 
apparatus, the available infrastructure, and the 
system of rules relate to each other and cons-
titute a system of its own: The transportation 
system, which is permanently expanding, in that 
elements are added to it, and linkages that are 
further developed (Urry 2004).
Even the simplest correlations are no lon-
ger perceived by the road users: more and more 
parents drive their children by car to the Kinder-
garten, because the way on foot or by bicycle has 
become too dangerous. Traffic has increased too 
much, i.e., there are too many automobiles on the 
streets, they argue. Or: drivers notice, while in 
a traffic jam, that traffic is flowing more speed-
ily in the next lane, and change lanes, only to 
cause a jam there. Such self-reinforcing effects 
of collective action cause, on the large scale as 
well, enormous problems for urban- and traffic 
planners. New and more spacious streets, for the 
most part, attract even more traffic, and worsen a 
city’s situation.2 It would be simple to point out 
more relationships which elude our life world ex-
perience. The eye soon loses its way as soon as 
one looks into the interconnections of the trans-
portation system with the energy system, with its 
heterogeneous technical and social components, 
with the economic system and its globally oper-
ating industries, with the political system and its 
global competition for ressources, with science 
and its innovation systems.
It’s slowly dawning on us: everything is con-
nected with everything else in a network of tech-
nical, social, and ecological systems which we 
barely understand, although we suspect “systema-
ticity” behind it, which can no longer be planned, 
directed, and controlled, even though it was mod-
ern society which set it in motion through rational 
organization (synchronization) and through com-
munications media which are based on trust (Gid-
dens 1990, p. 20ff.). Further, we are increasingly 
coming to realize that everything which is done 
by human hands will have consequences – sooner 
or later, here or there, for some of for many. These 
insights are at first glance trivial, but they indicate 
changes in the perception of the current ways of 
looking at problems.
(1) We are accustomed to describing and ana-
lyzing material, temporal, and social relationships 
as systemic or as systems, and so to take them into 
account: biological systems, financial systems, 
software systems, infrastructural systems, and 
much more. Historically, one can follow how the 
term “system”, from the 16th century on, has expe-
rienced a boom, if in different meanings – at first, 
as a “political entity”, e.g., by Thomas Hobbes 
(2007 [1651], Chapter XXII): “By systems, I un-
derstand any number of men joined in one interest 
or one business”, or as a scientific possibility for 
orientation, when the “Systematicity of the World” 
gains validity as a criterion for the correctness or 
falseness of systems of thought (Strub 1998, p. 
833). Early definitions by J.H. Lambert, from the 
18th century on, refer to conditions which have to 
be met when one speaks of systems: identifiable 
components which are recognizably connected to 
one another by a purpose. This connection has to 
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be temporally stable, as long as the purpose re-
quires it (Strub 1998, p. 835f.).
These deliberations were later carried on 
by biologists, with the exception that the aspect 
of purpose receded into the background, and the 
reproduction of the system came to the fore. Sys-
tems were described as complexes of interacting 
elements which distinguish themselves from an 
environment which itself consists of other com-
plexes (Bertalanffy 1950, p. 143). Systems im-
plement an emergent quality (an effect, a result, 
or a function) which cannot be derived from the 
qualities of the individual elements alone, but 
much rather from the relationship of the elements 
to one another. Further, mechanisms were dis-
cerned which keep a system in a “dynamic equi-
librium” – self-preservation through constant 
change: “constancy is maintained in a continuous 
change” (Bertalanffy 1950, p. 157). For it, a sort 
of information processing is respectively neces-
sary which can bring about a self-regulation, as 
it is described in cybernetics. Examples can be 
found especially in nature (Mitchell 2008, p. 51).
These pioneering deliberations lead to the 
fact that we accept the paradoxical constitution 
of systems which lets them be, on the one hand, 
ultra-stable, but in a few respects, on the other 
hand, fragile: constancy through change, open-
ness through closure, unity through difference, 
autonomy through selective dependency (with-
out self-sufficiency or autarky, therefore). With 
regard to social systems, these properties have 
enormous consequences for modern society: 
increasing the productivity of the economy, of 
politics, science, or law through functional dif-
ferentiation – the simultaneous evolution of au-
tonomous systems qua exclusive fulfillment of 
functions, the hypostatization of singular func-
tions, and the loss of a control center.
(2) At the same time, means of scientific 
observation were developed and installed, which 
can analyze and describe possible consequences 
of systemic differentiation: whether these are 
consequences through changes in the societal for-
mation, the introduction of new technologies or 
methods of organization, as well as consequenc-
es for, e. g., the individual, for areas of societal 
functionality, and, above all, for the natural en-
vironment. Basically, this is always some kind of 
analysis of systems with which we are confront-
ed, which, once they are installed, seem to make 
themselves autonomous, and of the assessment of 
these developments as a reflexion on some form 
of “re-affection” oder “self-infliction”.
It turns out, however, that the possibilities 
for attributing causes and effects become in-
creasingly more difficult, and that dispite (or be-
cause of) science’s ability constantly to increase 
its observational resolution: scaling down what 
is large (e.g., in models of the universe), enlarg-
ing what is small (e.g., in models of matter) and 
simplifying what is complex (e.g., in models of 
planetary climate). “Learning more sometimes 
means discovering hidden complexities which 
compel us to acknowledge that the confidence 
in our ability to master the situation was illu-
sory” (Dupuy 2005, p. 91; our Translation: CB/
RA). The problems crop up on a small scale, for 
example, when it is a matter of determining the 
dose-response relationships of substances on 
living organisms (NRC 2009, p. 97), and they 
also appear on the large scale, when it is a ques-
tion of determining the tipping points of various 
systems, upon which life on the planet depends 
(Lenton, Held et al. 2008).
Dispite the hidden complexietes, which we 
will refer to later on, there can be no question of 
a different, parallel evolutionary developments 
of humankind, together with its inventions of 
social and technical systems, on the one hand, 
and of nature, with its immense diversity of liv-
ing and inanimate manifestations, on the other. 
Every day, one discovers anew that everything 
is connected with everything else, and the fact 
that impacts and counter-impacts are generated 
through feedback loops, as well as through posi-
tive and negative self-reinforcement let the no-
tion of “harmony with nature” seem somewhat 
naive. On the contrary, one proclaims a new geo-
logical epoch: “Humanity, they [an influential 
group of scientists] contend, can be considered 
a geophysical force on par with supervolcanoes, 
asteroid impacts, or the kinds of tectonic shift 
that led to the massive glaciation of the Ordovi-
cian” (Vince 2011, p. 33). While the concept of 
the ecological equilibrium which had to be pro-
tected or brought about, was long upheld, newer 
approaches in environmental research reckon 
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with systems in permanent change, which are 
maintained by nonlinear dynamics. Consequent-
ly, reduction of the impacts of interventions, the 
restoration of damage, and precautionary action 
are analyzed with regard to anticipated damage 
(Groß, Heinrichs 2010, pp. 3–6).
(3) All in all, systems convey a sense of 
order and stability. Organisms, machines, or so-
cial systems realize their own respective prob-
lem solutions, functions, and performance, and 
exist as long as they can assert themselves in 
an environment. On the other hand, we know 
that much or everything is at stake if they break 
down: sickness and death, technical failures, or 
economic crises testify to it. If the manner of 
organization of systems is interrupted, the result 
is their dissolution or their malfunction. Organ-
isms can’t live just a little, their autopoiesis ei-
ther functions, or it doesn’t, and this “or” desig-
nates the change of condition from life to death 
without transition (Maturana 2001, p. 62). Tech-
nical systems are destroyed if the causal closure 
as intended in their design can’t be maintained 
(as one of many examples Vaughan 1996). Eco-
nomic crises anihilate capital and give rise to 
poverty for many.
The concept of “systemic risks”, which is 
receiving some attention at present, is supposed 
to make this potential explicit. It is supposed to 
point up the material, temporal, and social un-
boundedness of chains of events and of potentials 
for damage which affect entire systems and not 
merely individual components or isolated occur-
rences. With the above deliberations, we come 
nearer to the formulation of problems which con-
cern the core of Technology Assessment (TA) 
as the study of consequences (risk, danger, and 
chance) and Systems Analysis (demonstrating 
the “entirety” of the relationships; Paschen et al. 
1978, p. 23). The fact that TA also (and in many 
cases, above all) claims advice to be its responsi-
bility (Grunwald 2007, p. 8) should be left aside 
here for the time being. Just so much: TA and 
related fields of research have developed a pro-
nounced bias in the sense of education (Büscher 
2010). The impression arises that Systems Anal-
ysis has been pushed into the background to the 
advantage of education, and that, in the research 
process, there is very early certainty (and maybe 
much too soon), what society has to be educated 
about, mostly about wrong behavior.
2 Terminological and Conceptual 
Inexactitudes
The term systemic risks is inexact in two res-
pects, namely, with regard to its respective com-
ponents: system and risk.
2.1 System and the Environment
First, questions ensue when arguments from the 
general systems theory are taken into conside-
ration. When systemic risks are analyzed, then 
reference has to be made to systems in some 
sense or other, and, with it, to differences of sys-
tem and environment. No system exists without 
an environment, and without systems, there is 
no environment. For that reason, the question 
poses itself quite generally whether, in view of 
systemic risks, there is danger for the system 
or for the environment (or for both). We must 
further assume that the re-production of a sys-
tem depends on the transfer of some (not all) 
of the causes into the system’s range of control 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 19f.). It therefore has to be 
clarified, whether it is possible to distinguish 
between productive and unproductive causes 
in the system. This lets us think of mechanisms 
which work in and through the system, such as 
the metabolism of an organism, which internally 
converts substances from the environment into 
energy, and then of the possibility, whether the 
same mechanisms which set the systems going 
and keep them going can, under certain circum-
stances, cause their demise in the sense of a self-
endangerment (Bunge 2010, p. 375).
Not least, system or environment differen-
ces can arise by drawing borderlines, and the-
reby through a form of cutting off causalities. 
Occurrences in the environment don’t affect 
the system in a one-to-one correspondence. The 
system reacts on the basis of its own conditions, 
and possibilities for operation to external shocks 
(which, in reality, are internal shocks) and stres-
sors. Accordingly, it has to be explained, to 
which extent occurrences in the environment 
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have effects in a system, resp., how they are 
passed on within the system.
2.2 Risk and Decision
Second, questions pose themselves when argu-
ments from risk research are taken into account. 
It is known that “risk” designates an expecta-
tion that damage which is initiated by present 
events could possibly be incurred in the future. 
A risk implies a decision with regard to a cal-
culation which includes the contingent course 
of future events. In this sense, risk is a form of 
time-binding which permits making future pre-
sents relevant for action as present futures (Luh-
mann 2005, p. 71; Esposito 2007, p. 94). With 
it, an important difference from the concept of 
danger is already indicated. In the material re-
spect, the ascertainment of hazards is based 
on experience gained from other observations 
of more or less linear causal chains between a 
source of disturbance and possible deviations 
from normal conditions. Estimations of risk, on 
the other hand, fall back on model-based con-
structions of event- and error- chains in order 
to include possible causalities, about which no 
empirical knowledge is available (Ladeur 1993, 
p. 209f). This applies not only for the – in the 
meantime well-known – cases of the develop-
ment and use of risky high technology, in which 
trial-and-error learning is ruled out, and asses-
sing the consequences is tremendously difficult. 
In the temporal respect, the problem lies deeper. 
The uncertainties about future events don’t re-
sult out of ignorance of the relationships alone, 
but out of the circumstance that risky decisions 
themselves bring about a reality that didn’t exist 
beforehand. In that the openness of the future is 
used to be able to grasp opportunities, decision-
making processes principally generate a lack of 
transparency. In the attempt to dispose over the 
future, decisions as present commitments shape 
future presents. Luhmann (1993, p. 281) called 
this “open” (before) and “closed” (afterwards) 
“contingency”. The consequences of decisions 
will manifest themselves more or less probably 
only after a commitment which is observable as 
such has been carried out. Before that, any as-
sessment of the consequences remains a more or 
less uncertain prognosis.
2.3 Deviations from Normal Operation?
If one summarizes these deliberations, then the 
intuitively plausible term of systemic risks calls 
for an explanation, because systems don’t deci-
de, and don’t take any risks. They either operate 
or not. Expectations are addressed to the manner 
of operation of technical and social systems, with 
regard to functions and results. Risks and ha-
zards then mean possible deviations from “nor-
mal operation”, which can affect everyone who 
comes into contact with the respective systems. 
If one doesn’t mean exclusively exogenous cau-
ses for the deviation (typical: natural hazards), 
then the processes of decision-making come as 
endogenous causes in question. But since, in the 
case of systemic risks, it should precisely not be a 
matter of individual decisions, aggregate effects 
have to be explained. This problem is solved in 
that one distinguishes different levels of social 
reality. On the one hand, one makes reference to 
the realization of individual operations, which, 
on the other hand, realize systemic relationships 
in a nontransparent network of an infinite multi-
tude of other operations. In the case of systemic 
risks, this means that a multitude of decisions 
can endanger a system if they initiate emergent 
effects which affect the system’s reproduction.
If this is correct, then we have to inquire 
into the respective rationalities of decision-ma-
king which encourage taking risks in individual 
cases, because opportunities are openened by it. 
One possibly finds that, on the level of individual 
operations, promising orientations on the level 
of a system relationship can have collective ef-
fects (or so maintains Deutschmann 2008, p. 515 
in connection with the present financial market 
crisis). This addresses self-endangerment poten-
tials which are only inadequately defined with 
the term of systemic risks, because systems don’t 
put themselves at risk, but aggregate effects of 
individual operations give rise to hazards. In the 
economy, these phenomena, like a bank-run, are 
discussed as the summation of individual decisi-
ons (Kambhu et al. 2007, p. 5).
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3 The Differentiation of Systemic Risks
We first have to ask to which extent systemic 
risks differ from non-systemic risks. The first ob-
vious mark of a distinction comes about through 
reference to systemic qualities, namely, comple-
xity, concatenation, densification, or connectivity. 
Occasional, isolated situations characterized by 
uncertainty are precisely not meant. Systemic and 
non-systemic risk situations are determined by 
expectations about the courses of future events. 
Whoever believes himself to be secure does not 
expect disappointment, although it may occur, and 
whoever exposes himself to danger takes the pos-
sibility of disappointment into account, as risk.3 
Every small investor has to calculate the risks of 
the possible loss of investment, as opposed to the 
possible profits when he chooses an investment 
form. At the same time, however, his expecta-
tions are directed at a continuation of a “normal 
operation” of the economy, which expresses itself 
in economic growth, currency stability, and the 
liquidity of the banks. This expectation can also 
be disappointed, as we have recently again expe-
rienced. The loss can therefore be caused by indi-
vidual actions or by systemic events. In addition, 
individual actions can lead to systemic effects. 
But nevertheless, a difference still has to be made 
between isolated and systemic events, between 
individual and collective effects, and between li-
mited and unbounded extents of damage.
3.1 Unboundedness
Current discussions on systemic risks or syste-
mic events refer, above all, to the spatial, tempo-
ral, and social unboundedness of the damaging 
occurrences. In the case of systemic events, regi-
onal, national, or global concatenations of dama-
ge are assumed, which can also occur with a de-
lay in time, and can have an enormous potential 
for damage (IRGC 2010, p. 9; Renn, Keil 2008, 
p. 350). The concatenations refer either to corre-
lations among the elements of a system or to de-
pendencies among different systems. The former 
points to endangering the functional reliability of 
a system itself: “Systemic risk refers to the risk 
or probability of breakdowns in an entire system, 
as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or 
components, and is evidenced by co-movements 
(correlation) among most or all parts” (Kaufman, 
Scott 2003, p. 371). The latter points to possible 
external effects as a result of losses of functiona-
lity in a system, which causes completely separa-
te problems in other areas. The finance industry, 
for example, which grants no loans because it has 
cash problems, resp., reciprocally assumes a lack 
of liquidity, endangers the functional reliability 
of the entire economy, which, in its turn, has con-
sequences for governmental action (Kambhu et 
al. 2007, p. 5). This emphasizes society’s depen-
dence on systems. The OECD study on “Emer-
ging Risks” highlights processes of densification 
and networking, caused by the increase of popu-
lation in conurbations, and by the economic con-
centration in certain regions.4 In this case, one 
has to distinguish between exogenous shocks 
in densely-settled regions, which can cause im-
mense damage, due to the enormous exposition 
of human beings and material goods (Wenzel et 
al. 2007; Berz 2004) and the interdependences 
among critical infrastructures which arise out of 
densification and concentration (Perrow 2007).
3.2 Transitions from Non­systemic to 
Systemic
Is it now possible to characterize the transitions 
from non-systemic occurrences to systemic occur-
rences? Or can it only be ascertained ex-post that a 
systemic risk existed, which then manifested itself 
as the catastrophe which had already happened? 
The unbounded extent of damage is distinguished 
from a limited extent of damage by a quantitati-
ve and qualitative leap. But how can this leap be 
characterized? Can it be determined quantitatively 
in monetary losses, resp., the loss of human lives, 
or qualitatively by modelling regime-shifts? The 
former could certainly require work on definitions 
for every event, and the latter could only be de-
termined ex-post. The same holds true for other 
criteria which one can sort according to material, 
temporal, or social viewpoints:
 • When it is a question of irreversibility from a 
condition after to a condition before the da-
mage, then one has to clarify what (or from 
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which point in time on) it is irreversible, so 
that it can be declared to be systemic;
 • if it is a question of the delay of a case of dama-
ge relative to the occurrence of the case, then 
it has to be clarified how long a delay must last 
so that the event can be classified as systemic;
 • if it is a question of inequal afflictedness by 
the damage incurred, then the extent of the 
inequality has to be determined, on the other 
hand, in order to justify the ascertainment of 
systemic risks (WBGU 1999, p. 55).
With these exercises in definition, however, ex-
planatory content would scarcely be inherent in 
the concept of systemic risks. It would remain a 
term for dramaturgic purposes.
4 Contributions to this Thematic Focus
In this special issue, possibilities for the “assess-
ment” of the phenomenon are to be ascertained 
for Technology Assessment. To this end, authors 
from various disciplines were requested to pre-
sent extracts of their research.
4.1 Complex Systems in General
Belinda Cleeland presents a selection of the cen-
tral arguments from two studies by the Interna-
tional Risk Governance Council (IRGC 2009; 
IRGC 2010). While the first report was only 
marginally concerned with complex systems, the 
focus of the analyses in the following report lay 
on the characteristics of systems and of complex 
processes, as well as on the danger which results 
from these characteristics. Belinda Cleeland’s 
contribution has been placed at the beginning of 
this special issue, because it points out epistemo-
logical difficulties. How can we acquire know-
ledge about systems and their properties which 
elude simple causal schemata of cause and ef-
fect? Emergence, non-linear dynamics, delayed 
effects, catastrophic thresholds, path dependen-
cies are some key words. It will not come as a 
surprise that the IRGC experts come to the con-
clusion that the endogenous effects of complex 
systems bring about new dangers. Only the ques-
tion poses itself, to which extent the systems we 
scrutinize endanger themselves or other systems 
(or both). In this respect, the following contribu-
tion by Helmut Willke makes some suggestions.
4.2 Financial System
Helmut Willke has long occupied himself with 
systemic risks in the financial system. In this 
special issue, as well as in his study on “Gover-
nance of Global Finance” (Willke 2007), he de-
scribes the consequences of the autonomy of a 
social system. Through the present financial and 
economic crisis, his analyses have received some 
empirical underpinnings.
Willke describes, following Niklas 
Luhmann’s works (1994, 1999), the reflexive me-
dium, money as a basic structural characteristic of 
the finance industry. A symbolic communication 
medium, which (1) acquires its value by proving 
itself and by trust, in other words, solely through 
the generalized attribution that one can buy so-
mething with money, and (2) which itself becomes 
buyable, as a loan, and by paying interest, which 
dramatically increases the accessibility of capital 
and, with it, the possibilities for investment. Capi-
tal makes investments possible before returns can 
be expected from the investments. It is needed to 
tide over momentary shortages. This form of self-
reference (or of self-validation) and of reflexivi-
ty generates, especially in the financial industry, 
intrinsic values, behind which a real asset often 
scarcely seems tangible (Willke 2007, p. 140).
The elementary operations of society’s eco-
nomy are payments. The elementary operations 
of the financial industry are payments inclusive 
of temporally and monetarily determined con-
ditions of repayment. Payments and repayments 
are temporally separated, and this difference ge-
nerates risks and opportunities (Willke 2007, p. 
141). Risk acceptance is an inherent necessity for 
investments (financial capital as “securities, mo-
netary and derivative assets”). Willke’s argument 
is that, through these prerequisites, limited and 
unlimited networks can be distinguished in the 
economy. Limited networks constitute themsel-
ves in the social dimension between producers 
and consumers, sellers and buyers, in their res-
pective economic roles through payments for 
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goods. These networks are limited by the num-
ber of actors participating. Principally unlimited 
networks constitute themselves through the pri-
mary recourse to the temporal dimension, when 
the open future permits an endless architecture of 
options. “As the field of options within the finan-
cial system is extended into the depth of structu-
red derivative instruments and into the labyrinths 
of prolonged chains of conditioned events, the 
chances and risks of aggregate or even systemic 
effects of mutual reinforcement, snowballing, le-
verage and positive feedback loops beyond sing-
le firms loom large” (Willke 2007, p. 156).
4.3 Software Systems
Which leaps in complexity might technologi-
cal and organizational systems have made since 
Charles Perrow has been investigating the inher-
ent structural susceptibility of their design since 
the 1990’s. One is tempted to say that his argu-
ments carry, not only in the Age of Mechanics, but 
also in the Age of Electronics. The outstanding 
argument in “Normal Accidents” of 1984 was 
that uncontrollability originates in the structure 
of large-scale technologies. Therefore, he concen-
trates his analysis not on errors by operators, on 
design, or on the equipment, or on disregarding 
safety regulations. He was more interested in ana-
lyzing the nature of high technology, and uses two 
independent dimensions for classifying: linear or 
complex interactions, and tight and loose coupling 
of technical elements. By combining both dimen-
sions, Perrow generated a crosstab as a heuristic to 
highlight many dangerous technologies: nuclear 
energy systems, genetics, and the chemical indus-
try, for example (Perrow 1984, p. 97).
Further into the 1990’s, he upheld his ar-
guments in discussions with other theoreticians. 
Some of them can also be found in the different 
contributions in this current special issue. The 
combination of complex interaction and tight 
coupling, which characterizes the form of tech-
nology discussed above, will produce unexpec-
ted interactions of error that will defeat safety 
devices. That does not mean that prevention, an-
ticipation of errors, analytical decision-making 
is useless, but all this is no guarantee for safety. 
Referring to other social theories, Perrow claims 
that organizations are bounded in their rationality 
to make decisions and that their mode of decis-
ion-making can be described with the “Garbage 
Can”-model. That means decision-making under 
a high degree of uncertainty is characterized by 
unstable and unclear goals, misunderstanding 
and mislearning, happenstance and confusion. 
That leads to a pessimistic view regarding effici-
ency and safety goals. Furthermore, Perrow in-
sists on a competition of different goals of orga-
nization; safety is not the only one, and is not at 
all considered to be the most important one. Also 
relevant to a high degree is production pressure, 
profit pressure, growth, prestige and departmen-
tal power struggles (Perrow 1994).
Perrow transfers these insights onto the pre-
sent situation, in which many critical technolo-
gies are being driven by standardized, non-mo-
dular software systems. This produces a high de-
gree of security problems through management 
decisions. This is a situation which could have 
far-reaching consequences, as the author shows 
in his contribution.
4.4 Critical Infrastructure
Carsten Orwat concerns himself with the hypo-
thesis that systemic risks arise when technical 
systems and governance structures don’t develop 
adequately to one another. He distinguishes three 
planes of analysis and their interactions: techno-
logical developments (1), societal organization, 
resp., industrial structure as the branch’s internal 
governance (2), and the regulative level as exter-
nal governance (3). An example which he del-
ves into is the so-called “Smart Grid”: a socio-
technical development in the energy sector with 
the objective of a better integration of renewable 
energies with volatile power generation.
New hazardous situations possibly result 
from the transformation to be expected in the 
energy sector, if a tight connectivity of formerly 
loosely coupled components is pushed. Realiza-
tion of an “Energy Internet” with connections of 
all Smart-Grid components by IP-communica-
tion leads to a new connectivity, which entails a 
great number of points of attack, a low level of 
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security for numerous “terminals”, or weaknes-
ses of the IP-standards. Flaws in subsystems can 
possibly lead to the dysfunction of a large part of 
a system, or of the entire system.
Orwat gathers arguments from diverse 
analyses of the energy sector, in which the as-
sumptions are expressed that faulty or inadequa-
te governance structures systematically cause 
among rationally-behaving actors activity which 
brings about hazards. Through the economic 
pressure for reform in the electricity industry 
(privatization, competition), it has come to the 
reduction of redundancies, with power failures 
as a result. Economic considerations lead to less 
investment in IT-security. For reason of costs, 
SCADA-systems are connected to the Internet. 
Through the pressure of costs, the use of standard 
software (COTS) in energy systems is to be ex-
pected, through which weaknesses in the system 
are multiplied – an assumption which is suppor-
ted by Perrow’s analyses.
4.5 Natural Hazards and Socio­Technical 
Systems
Bijan Khazai, James E. Daniell, und Friedemann 
Wenzel provide us with data and interpretations 
from the viewpoint of Hazard Research on a cur-
rent catastrophe, the March 2011 Japan Earth-
quake at the Tohoku coast (better known under 
the label Fukushima-Disaster). Above all, they 
attempt to analyze the different events in their 
effects as a concatenation, in that they distin-
guish causes, direct impacts, indirect impacts, 
und exacerbating factors. In essence, they come 
to the conclusion: “The Tohoku earthquake was 
typical of disasters with cascade-like spreading, 
and dynamic risk assessment procedures should 
follow from recent disaster experience that in-
corporates dynamic interactions between natural 
hazards, socio-economic factors, and technologi-
cal vulnerabilities” (Khazai et al. in this issue) . 
They describe how exogenous processes impose 
stress on technical and social systems, and set off 
a chain of damage which to the present hasn’t 
been completely registered – primarily because 
the Fukushima-Ruin will long continue to be a 
danger for the health of the Japanese population.
Notes
1) I would like to thank my colleagues at ITAS for 
their help and discussions concerning the contents 
and composition of this thematic focus. Many 
thanks belong to Robert Avila for his corrections 
and translations, furthermore for his patience with 
the non-native-speaking fraction in this issue.
2) Megacities suffer under these self-reinforcing ef-
fects: “If we improve the city’s appearance, fur-
nish it with good streets, train connections, and 
apartments, – if we make life more pleasant – ever 
more people are drawn to the environs” (A state-
ment of Rahul Mehrotra, Urban Planner, cited in 
the German edition of “Maximum City: Bombay 
Lost and Found”; Mehta 2006, p. 185).
3) The beginnings of systematic risk calculation with 
statistics are assumed to lie in the 17th century. 
[Insurances] developed to the same extent that 
modern statistics (since the middle of the 17th 
century) were well-founded and fully developed, 
i.e., risk became calculable (Conze 2004, p. 848).
4) The much-quoted passage is: “A systemic risk [...] 
is one that affects the systems on which society 
depends: health, transport, environment, telecom-
munications, etc” (OECD 2003, p. 30).
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